America's inability to convince the United Nations (UN) Security Council to endorse military action against the regime of Saddam Hussein marked a watershed in U.S. relations with the world body. To some, it signaled the Security Council's flight from responsibility; to others, America's disdain for international opinion.

Beyond Iraq lie deep questions about unilateralism and multilateralism, law and power, and the relation of the UN to American interests. Various aspects of the UN's work were examined in a series of panel discussions at AEI moderated by Joshua Muravchik. Panels looked at UN efforts at peacekeeping, human rights, and arms control, as well as the UN's special treatment of Israel and the culture of Turtle Bay.

February (Series Launch): What Are We to Think about the UN?
To launch the series, three distinguished public figures shared their assessments of the UN's record and prospects.

March: The UN and Human Rights
This session coincided with the annual meeting of the UN Human Rights Commission (UNHRC) in Geneva. The previous year, Libya, one of the world's most repressive dictatorships, chaired the commission. Every year numerous tyrannical states angle for seats on the commission, sitting in hypocritical judgment while shielding their own unsavory practices from scrutiny. Can the UNHRC be made to serve the cause of human rights? Has this yearly debacle become emblematic of the fatal weaknesses built into the UN structure?

May: Whither Nation-Building?
Once perceived as errands of mercy, exercises in "nation-building" have since moved to the center of international security concerns. The United States and the UN have traditionally assumed the lion's share of responsibility for these efforts, sometimes working together harmoniously--but often not. Regardless of whether a mission is run from Foggy Bottom or Turtle Bay, postwar reconstruction efforts have suffered consistently from the disconnect between ambitious strategic objectives and meager institutional capabilities. This event, cosponsored by AEI and the UN Development Program, took stock of U.S.-UN cooperation and frictions in post-conflict reconstruction efforts and evaluated current plans for strengthening both international capacity and U.S.-UN dialogue for future efforts.

August: The United Nations and Israel
The sovereign equality of nations is one of the UN's seminal principles. But one nation--Israel--has always enjoyed "special" treatment at the UN. Repeal of the notorious Zionism-Racism Resolution of the General Assembly proved to be little more than a false dawn. Israel remains the only state ineligible for membership on the Security Council, draws special attention in both the Security Council and the General Assembly, and remains the unique focus of a number of specialized UN agencies. Does the UN's obsessive hostility to the Middle East's sole democracy detract from its ability to promote peace and human rights? Can this obsession be overcome?

September: The International Atomic Energy Agency
Soon after stepping down in 1976 as U.S. ambassador to the UN, Daniel Patrick Moynihan said that the IAEA "is the one UN institution the world could not very well do without." But in the 1980s, Saddam Hussein nearly completed the development of a nuclear weapon under the noses of IAEA inspectors. Since then, rogue states like North Korea and Iran have either produced nuclear weapons or brought themselves to the threshold of doing so by defying or evading the IAEA. This calls into question the overall efficacy of the inspection agency as a monitoring organization. Is the IAEA an effective shield against nuclear proliferation? If not, how can it be improved? Is there an alternative mechanism that can be proposed?

December: The United Nations Oil-for-Food Scandal
Over the past few months, congressional and Central Intelligence Agency inquiries have unveiled the magnitude of the UN Oil-for-Food scandal. The Congressional Subcommittee on Investigations estimates that Saddam Hussein's government illicitly siphoned $21.3 billion from the program, roughly twice as much as originally estimated. Hussein used the funds to purchase weapons, to pay off foreign businessmen and politicians, and, according to the House Committee on International Relations, to reward terrorist sympathizers. Numerous officials from the UN and from foreign governments and businesses have been implicated in the scandal. Who, ultimately, will be deemed responsible for the scandal? What can we learn from it? How will it affect the future of the UN and its relationship with the United States?